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FOREWORD 
The research on this six-month program was carried out by personnel 
of the Biomedical Research Division of the Electronics and Computer Systems 
Laboratory at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332. 
Dr. Steve Sharpe and Dr. Scott Crowgey served as Principal Investigators. 
The program, which was sponsored by the Brink's Engineering Company, was 
designated by Georgia Tech as Project A-3452. 
This Final Report covers work which was performed from 4 January 1983 
through 18 June 1983. This work was made possible through the combined 
efforts of many people at Brink's Engineering Company and at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology. The authors would especially like to thank Mr. 
Bill Gunn and Mr. Bill Heath at Brink's Engineering Company, both of whom 
contributed significantly to this program's success. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Scott R. Crowgey, M.D. 
Principal Investigator 
APPROVED 
J. C. Toler, Chief 
Biomedical Research Division 
SUMMARY 
The objectives of this investigation were to: (1) analyze the circuit 
of the Brink's Safe Case Design and measure electrical parameters under 
conditions simulating human contact and (2) prepare a formal report present-
ing measurement results compared to safe limits for electrical shock as 
published in the open literature. 
Analysis of the circuit design was performed by Dr. Steve Sharpe who 
has previously relayed his analysis to the Brink's Engineering Company by 
means of an ongoing interaction with Mr. Bill Gunn and Mr. Bill Heath. 
As a result of this interaction and of preliminary results of an extensive 
literature review, the original Safe Case Design went through two major 
changes prior to arriving at the final design. Measurements and analysis 
of data for each of the three Safe Case Designs were conducted requiring 
extension of a three-month program to a six-month program. Results for 
each of the three Safe Case designs will be presented in this report and 
analyzed with respect to established safety thresholds in the open literature. 
A review of the literature revealed that current is the parameter which 
best defines the safety threshold for any type of electrical contact. Safe 
Case Designs #1 and #2 both showed a wide variation in current amplitudes 
over the resistance range commonly used to simulate the human body. Currents 
varied from being at or above safety thresholds for low resistances to being 
ineffective for stimulation at high resistances. Safe Case Design #3, however, 
provided a fairly constant current amplitude over the whole range of resistances 
tested and was consistently below the fibrillation thresholds of danger. 
Therefore, Safe Case Design #3 was felt to be relatively safe for the purpose 
of providing a noxious electric stimulus. 
Burn potentials were assessed for each Safe Case design. Designs #1 
and #2 were both characterized by low energy outputs and low probabilities 
of causing surface burns. Design #3 was characterized by higher energy 
outputs over time which had the potential for causing skin surface burns 
if contact is prolonged. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that this analysis of safety is based 
on reported fibrillation and "let-go" thresholds for the average healthy 
ii 
adult male. The Safe Case should not be carried by persons with heart pace-
makers or by persons with known heart disease. For this population, even 
small and innocent electrical shocks may result in ventricular fibrillation 
and death. C. F. Dalziel states [6]: 
"Due to variations in the physical condition existing among men it 
must be stressed that no electric shock can be considered as absolutely 
safe, however establishing a current below which ventricular fibrillation 
is unlikely should be of practical value in improving the safety of 
electrical installations." 
iii 
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INTRODUCTION 
The research described in this Final Report was the result of efforts 
performed during a six-month period to evaluate the electric safety of the 
Brink's Safe Case. Efforts involved during this period included an extensive 
review of the open literature regarding safe limits for electrical shock, 
measurements of the electric parameters of the Safe Case under conditions 
simulating human contact, and analysis of the measurements and comparison 
of these results with known safe limits for electrical shock as published 
in the open literature. 
The first section of this report will summarize results of the litera-
ture survey, initially describing the known hazards of human contact with 
electrical shock followed by reported thresholds of danger along with brief 
discussions of the hazards of impulse currents and the hazards of electrical 
burns. The second section describes results from the evaluations of three 
Safe Case Designs along with comparisons of the electrical parameters with 
reported thresholds of safety. 
1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Electrical Injuries  
Electrical injuries can result from a variety of mechanisms. Dr. Butler 
and Dr. Gant in 1977 [3] listed the following as possible mechanisms: 
	
"1. 	direct contact with an energized object...; 
2. arcing of electricity to a grounded victim; 
3. exposure to the intense heat of an "arc" flash; 
4. exposure to flames from ignited clothing and environment; and 
5. falls precipitated by an electrical accident." 
The effect of the electrical current in electrical injuries depends primarily 
on the parameters of current, voltage, and resistance at the time of 
electrical contact. Additional factors which must also be considered in any 
type of biological electrical contact include the following [2,9,31]: 
1. current pathway through the body, 
2. physical condition of the victim, 
3. frequency of the current, 
4. magnitude of the current, 
5. shock duration, 
6. waveform of the current, and 
7. the phase of the heart cycle at the instant of the shock. 
As can be inferred from the above list, it is the current which determines the 
amount of danger from an electrical contact. Variables which further affect 
the degree of danger include the frequency, magnitude, duration, and waveform 
of the current produced. Current flow can cause tissue damage by the 
generation of heat resulting in burns and coagulation necrosis; however, 
these thermal injuries are in general not life-threatening unless extensive. 
Current flow through the body can also cause a stimulation effect on the 
nerves and muscles in the tissues it passes through, and, depending on the 
tissue, can result in lethal effects. 
Current flow which is limited to an extremity may produce painful muscle 
contractions, and, if the frequency is high enough, may result in tetanic 
contractions (maximal continuous contraction of the muscles not subject to 
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voluntary control). This type of reaction usually causes no lasting damage 
other than the memory of a very disagreeable experience. However, should the 
current be of a large enough magnitude, the intense muscular contractions 
produced may sometimes result in fractures of the associated bones. Currents 
flowing through the lower nerve centers and spinal column may result in 
ejaculation at low intensities and in permanent neurological damage if the 
intensity is enough to produce thermal injuries. Currents passed through the 
head may result in unconsciousness and convulsions. Current flow through the 
nerve centers controlling respiration may produce respiratory inhibition 
which is usually only temporary, lasting only a few minutes to as long as a 
few hours after interruption of the current flow. Alternating currents 
flowing across the chest may result in tetanic contractions of the chest 
muscles, thus inhibiting respiration during the duration of current flow 
[2,4,9,26,30]. The most lethal form of current flow through the body is that 
which involves the heart muscle, resulting in a condition known as ventricular 
fibrillation. Ventricular fibrillation is an uncoordinated asynchronous 
contraction of the ventricular muscle fibers as opposed to the normal 
coordinated rhythmic contractions which provide a good cardiac output of 
blood to the body [1,2,4]. During this condition, the heart quivers instead 
of beating and cannot effectively pump blood through the body. Once 
ventricular fibrillation starts, the blood circulation ceases, resulting in 
unconsciousness within 10 seconds and subsequent irreversible brain damage 
and possible death in 4 to 6 minutes unless cardiopulmonary resuscitation is 
begun [1,2]. This condition is only rarely spontaneously reversible, is 
usually fatal, and is generally the cause of death in instantaneous 
electrocutions. 
Body Resistance  
Most electrical injuries occur as a result of the contact of a body with 
a known potential difference. Again, it must be emphasized that it is the 
current produced by this contact and not the voltage which determines the 
amount of injury incurred by this contact. Therefore, as a result of Ohm's 
Law, the body impedance is quite often a major factor in the determination of 
the severity of an electrical shock [2,4,14,23]. Ohm's Law states that I = 
E/R, or current (I) is defined by the potential difference (E) divided by the 
resistance of the body (R) across the potential difference. The resistances 
of various body tissues vary widely, being greatest in bone and diminishing in 
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the following order: bone, fat, tendon, skin, muscle, vessel, and nerve. Body 
impedances also vary with frequency. For low frequencies the body impedance 
is essentially resistive. Above 1000 Hz the body impedance begins to exhibit 
nonlinear characteristics due to its cellular make-up [4,7]; however, man's 
decreasing sensitivity with increasing frequency suggests there is less and 
less stimulation effect as the frequency increases [7]. As the stimulation 
effect decreases, the potential for thermal injury increases. Skin 
resistance is the most important component of the body impedance since current 
must first pass through the skin before it can reach the underlying lower 
resistance tissues. Average skin resistance is 40,000 ohms, but resistance of 
the calloused palm may be as high as 1,000,000 ohms while that of moist clean 
skin may be as low as 300 ohms [2,4,18,31]. It must also be remembered that 
skin with its initially high resistance will gradually lose its protective 
capability with prolonged electrical contact due to vasodilation at first 
followed by breakdown of the skin secondary to blisters and burns. In 
developing a model for the prediction of electrical shock hazards, Charles 
Dalziel [4,8,18] recommended a minimum value of 500 ohms. He states: 
"A value of 500 ohms is commonly used as the minimum resistance of 
the human body between major extremities and this value is commonly 
used in estimating shock currents during industrial accidents. A 
value of 1500 ohms, which may be too high, is used to represent the 
body circuit between the normal perspiring hands of a worker and in 
estimating currents of the reaction current level."[4] 
The value of 500 ohms is used to represent the internal body resistance 
excluding the skin. It should be noted that the Bell System and other 
industries frequently use the value of 1500 ohms in estimating shock hazards 
[2]. 
Thresholds of Hazard  
As a result of extensive research by many different investigators, it has 
been shown that the current flowing between two conductors of different 
potentials produces first sensation followed by muscle contraction, 
ventricular fibrillation, defibrillation, and finally burns. This is the 
order of events seen as current intensity is increased. It has also been well 
documented that the amount of current required for physiologic effects is 
proportional to the frequency of the alternating current and that direct 
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current is tolerated at much higher thresholds than alternating current. In 
determining the safety of various current waveforms, the literature contains 
good documentation only for sinusoidal currents of varying frequency. Very 
little information is available on currents at frequencies other than power 
line frequencies, and even less data is available for currents with a waveform 
that is not sinusoidal. Charles Dalziel [4-11] has collected probably the 
largest volume of data on current thresholds of safety. He has divided 
current thresholds into three categories: Perception Thresholds, Let-Go 
Thresholds, and Fibrillation Thresholds. 
Perception Thresholds  
The Perception Threshold is defined as the current at which the presence 
of current can be sensed [1,2,4,7,18,26,31]. Stimulation with direct current 
produces a sensation of warmth while stimulation with alternating current 
produces a tingling sensation. For direct current the mean threshold of 
sensation for men was 5.2 milliamperes (mA) and for women was 3.5 mA for 
electrical contact with the hand. In contrast, for alternating current at 60 
Hertz the mean threshold was 1.1 mA (rms) for men and 0.7 mA (rms) for women 
[2,7]. Although currents of this level pose little biological danger, they 
are important in the setting of limits for household electrical devices, since 
these currents could possibly produce a startle reaction in a person resulting 
in a fall or some other involuntary reaction which could be hazardous to the 
individual. 
Pain thresholds show a great degree of variation between individuals and 
with skin impedance and current duration [2,9,29]. In general, pain 
thresholds for electrical current are lowered with increases in pulse dura-
tion and in the number of pulses applied [2,29]. Pain also seems to be 
closely related to current density. 
Let-Go Thresholds  
As current flowing in an extremity increases, the sensations of warmth 
and tingling also increase in severity until muscular reactions and pain 
develop. These muscular reactions are especially marked at alternating 
current frequencies between 10 hertz and 200 hertz. Eventually, a current 
level is reached at which muscular stimulation and the resultant muscular 
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contractions are so severe that the person cannot voluntarily release an 
electrical contact. The person is then said to "freeze" to the contact 
[1,2,4,10,11,18,26,31]. The maximum current that a person can tolerate and 
still release the conductor using the muscles directly stimulated is called 
the "let-go" threshold [2,4,9,10,11]. Dalziel has determined both the 
Perception and the Let-Go current thresholds for sinusoidal currents over a 
wide range of frequencies and for a large population of healthy males and 
females [2,4,7,10,11]. It has also been well documented than an individual 
can tolerate prolonged and repeated exposure to his "Let-Go" current with no 
serious after effects other than residual muscle aches from the contractions 
[2,4,11]. 
Dalziel has analyzed his data in terms of population percentiles for both 
Perception and Let-Go Thresholds. A graph of these percentile thresholds for 
varying frequencies has been plotted in Figure 1 and is an adaptation of 
Dalziel's own data [7,11]. The three lines for each group represent, from top 
to bottom, the 1/2 percentile, the 50 percentile, and the 99.5 percentile. An 
interpretation of the meaning of these percentile thresholds follows: for the 
Let-Go current levels, the 99.5 percentile threshold is that current at which 
99.5 percent of a large group of healthy adults could release themselves from 
contact with a current [2,4,10,11]. For the Perception Levels, the 99.5 
percentile current threshold is that current at which 99.5 percent of a large 
group of healthy adults could just perceive the presence of a current. In the 
past, the 99.5 percentile Let-Go Threshold has served as a definition of a 
reasonably safe electric current. However, as already mentioned a person can 
tolerate prolonged and repeated exposure to his Let-Go current without 
serious harm. 
For most normal healthy adult men the 99.5 percentile Let-Go Threshold at 
60 hertz is 9 mA (rms) while for normal adult women this level is 6mA (rms). 
Although Figure 1 displays the threshold levels for increasing frequency, 
there is very little information available for lower frequencies. As the 
current frequency decreases below 10 hertz, the Let-Go Threshold increases. 
Table 1 lists the Let-Go current levels for lower frequencies and for the 
different percentile groups as approximated from Dalziel's graph [11] of sine 
wave Let-Go Thresholds versus frequency. 
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Figure 1. Perception (A) and Let-Go (B) Percentile Thresholds vs. Frequency Plotted from Data Obtained by 
Charles Dalziel (7,11). Each Group of Thresholds Consist of Three Lines Representing 
(1) 0.5 Percentile, (2) 50 Percentile, and (3) 99.5 Percentile. Literature Values for Minimum 
Fibrillating Currents and Known Let-Go Thresholds for Children are Shown. 
TABLE 1 
SINE-WAVE LET-GO THRESHOLDS FOR MEN (AND WOMEN IN PARENTHESES) AS A FUNCTION OF LOW FREQUENCIES 
(Derived from graph by Dalziel [11]) 
Frequency 	 99.5% 	 Mean 	 0.5% 
	
60 Hz 	 9 mA rms 	 15.87 mA rms 	22.7 mA rms 
(6) (10.5) (15) 
10 Hz 	 10 mA rms 	 16.3 mA rms 	25 mA rms 
5 Hz 	 14 mA rms 	 23.4 mA rms 	37 mA rms 
D.C. 	 62 mA 	 73.7 mA 	 87 mA 
(Release Current) 	 (41) 
CO 
The data on direct current (dc) Let-Go Thresholds also included in Table 
1 requires further explanation. Obviously, for direct current there will be 
no repetitive or tetanic contractions of the muscle as there is with alternat-
ing current. However, on steadily increasing the direct currents being 
applied to the hand, the sensations of internal heating will increase and 
sudden changes in current magnitudes will produce muscular contractions while 
interruption of the current will produce a severe, objectionable shock. In 
Dalziel's experiments [11], the maximum dc current level a subject would 
tolerate and still release the contact voluntarily was termed the release 
current and was equated with alternating current Let-Go Thresholds. Thus, 
this level represents a voluntary endurance limit above which a certain 
percentage would refuse to tolerate anymore punishment as opposed to the Let-
Go Threshold which is an involuntary limit. 
Prior to discussing Fibrillation Thresholds, mention should be made of 
the effects of currents above Let-Go but less than Fibrillation levels. 
Dalziel and Lee [2,4,5] both found that 60 Hertz currents in this range, 
typically between 18 to 22 mA (rms) or more, flowing across the chest cavity 
would result in inhibition of respiration and signs of impending asphyxia 
until the current contact was broken. On interruption of the current, normal 
respirations would resume. 
Fibrillation Thresholds  
The intensity of current resulting in ventricular fibrillation is the 
ultimate determination of the threshold of safety, since electrical contact 
at or above the Fibrillation Threshold will result in death without medical 
intervention. Although the Perception Thresholds and Let-Go Thresholds are 
commonly used in the evaluation of electrical appliances for consumer protec-
tion, this report is primarily concerned with evaluating the safety of a 
device, the purpose of which is to shock a potential criminal. For this 
purpose the Ventricular Fibrillation Thresholds will be used to determine the 
safety of the device. 
In determining Fibrillation Thresholds, the literature has customarily 
been as conservative as possible by evaluating the thresholds assuming the 
worst possible conditions. It has been found that the worst possible current 
pathway through the body is a pathway parallel to the body axis, as from the 
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forearm to the opposite leg [2,9,13,21,26]. 	In dog experiments, W. B. 
Kouwenhoven, et al. [21] found that 9-10% of the total current passing through 
the body in this orientation would pass through the heart. In contrast, for a 
pathway transverse to the body axis, only 3% of the total current would pass 
through the heart. Thus, current pathways transverse to the body axis, as 
from one forearm to the opposite forearm, are not as dangerous as longitudinal 
pathways. Also, current pathways across the chest, from chest to forearm, 
from head to leg, and from forearm to opposite leg all exhibit almost 
identical fibrillation thresholds [13]. Thus, most fibrillation thresholds 
have been established for a pathway from one arm to the opposite leg. 
Fibrillation Thresholds are also commonly interpreted with knowledge of 
the fact that the susceptibility of the heart to fibrillation is greatest 
during the partial refractory phase of the cardiac cycle which constitutes 
about 20 percent of the whole cardiac cycle and which occurs simultaneously 
with the T wave of the EKG [2 1 9,13,27] . With shocks of about 0.1 second 
duration or less, it is practically impossible to produce ventricular fibril-
lation unless the shocks coincide at least in part with this sensitive phase 
of the cardiac cycle. Fibrillation Thresholds for short shock durations are 
commonly derived from tests in which the shock corresponds with this phase of 
the cardiac cycle, thus assuming worst case conditions. Therefore, all 
fibrillation thresholds are interpreted as the level of current which would 
cause fibrillation when applied during the most sensitive phase of the cardiac 
cycle. 
No data is available relating the effects of age and health on fibrilla-
tion thresholds, and it must be remembered that all current thresholds are 
recommended only for healthy men and women, usually between the ages of 20 and 
46. Although the threshold levels are commonly calculated assuming a conser-
vative weight of 50 kilograms (110 pounds), the applicability of these levels 
to the elderly with possible heart conditions must be an item of concern. In 
addition, it has been shown that a 60 Hz current as low as 180 microamperes 
through a myocardial electrode can produce ventricular fibrillation in humans 
[26], and it has been estimated that currents as low as 20 microamperes 
through an intracardiac electrode could also produce fibrillation. Thus, the 
person with a cardiac pacemaker must always be considered an extreme risk for 
any type of electrical shock, and the fibrillation thresholds in the 
literature will not apply to this population. 
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Practically all available information on fibrillating currents has been 
obtained as a result of animal experimentation, from which the data has been 
extrapolated to apply to the human case. All investigators appear to agree 
that there is a current-weight relationship between various species, as well 
as a relationship to the duration of stimulation [2,4-6, 9, 13, 26 ]. Dalziel 
has summarized this data in an electrocution equation for men which states 
that the minimum 60 Hz electric current causing ventricular fibrillation is 
proportional to body weight and inversely proportional to the square root of 
shock duration, or I=KNY. In this expression, I is the critical current in 
milliamperes rms of the 60 Hz sinusoidal current, K is a constant determined 
on the basis of body weight, and T is the duration of the shock in seconds. 
Dalziel and Lee suggest the conservative estimate for the body weight of man 
as 50 kg (110 lb) which would make the constant K=116 for the minimum 
fibrillating current and K=185 for the definite fibrillating current 
[2,4,5,26]. A value for K of 100 has been recommended for children [1]. The 
minimum fibrillating current is defined as the current at which only one-half 
percent of the population would be in danger of fibrillation while the 
definite fibrillating current is that current at which 99.5 percent of the 
population would be in danger of ventricular fibrillation [5,6]. For the 
purposes of safety evaluations, the minimum fibrillating current should be 
used. The Dalziel equation is described as being applicable to shock dura-
tions from 8.3 milliseconds (one-half of a 60 Hz) to 5 seconds. Shocks 
shorter than 8.3 milliseconds are better classified as impulse shocks, which 
will be discussed separately. Dalziel states [5 ]that from 5 seconds to 20 or 
30 seconds, evidence indicates that the threshold remains fairly steady and 
may drop only slightly. For longer periods, it is felt that asphyxial changes 
will exert an increasingly important influence, and may drop the threshold 
even further. 
In summary, from Dalziel's equation the minimum fibrillating current for 
adults is 116 mA for a 1 second shock and for children is 100 mA for a shock of 
the same duration. The generally accepted threshold current below which the 
chance of fibrillation is very slight in man is 100 mA for 60-Hz sine wave 
shocks for 3 seconds or more [2,9]. 
There is very little information available on ventricular fibrillation 
currents that do not have a frequency of 60 Hz or a sinusoidal waveform. 
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Ferris, et al. [13] investigated the hazards of dc and ac currents in animals 
and found that the level of dc current required to produce fibrillation was 
five times greater than the fibrillation level for 60 Hz ac current. It was 
also postulated that for shock durations of a fraction of a second, the dc/ac 
ratio for fibrillation would approach unity. Dalziel 18] stated that the 
dangerous level for 60 Hz fibrillating currents of very short duration would 
approach the crest value of that current and that the dc/ac ratio would 
approach 1:1 for short shocks in terms of crest ac current or Vni for rms ac 
current. Knickerbocker [19] has collected more recent data using 20 Hz 
currents and dc currents and found that the dc/ac (rms) fibrillating current 
ratios for short duration shocks approached 1:1, and not lid. Knickerbocker 
also found that for longer duration shocks greater than 1 second, the dc/ac 
(rms) fibrillating ratios remained constant at 3.7:1 and not at 4.8 - 5.0:1 as 
previously theorized by Dalziel. Although Knickerbocker's results may be 
influenced by the fact that he was using 20 Hz currents, which are known to 
have slightly higher thresholds for both Let-Go and Fibrillation currents, it 
is probably safer to be more conservative in estimating dangerous current 
thresholds by using Knickerbocker's dc/ac (rms) ratios to define safe dc 
currents. 
It is generally accepted that the heart is most sensitive to currents 
with frequencies between 30 and 100 Hz [2,4,13,20]. In this frequency range, 
the fibrillation threshold is fairly constant and is approximately the same as 
the thresholds obtained for 50 and 60 Hz currents. For currents with 
frequencies above and below this range, the fibrillation thresholds begin to 
rise. Research on currents with frequencies below 30 Hz have shown an 
increasing fibrillation threshold with decreasing frequency. Ferris, et al. 
[13] demonstrated that for currents less than 30 Hz, the fibrillation 
threshold would rise and gradually approach the dc fibrillation threshold 
which they found to be five times greater than the 60 Hz fibrillation current. 
Kouwenhoven, et al. [20] also examined low frequency currents and found that 
the current required to produce fibrillation increased significantly at 
frequencies below 10 Hz. In fact, it was found in their dog experiments that 
2 second duration shocks of 3-4 mA at 2 Hz failed to cause fibrillation when 
applied directly to the heart, whereas 60 Hz currents of 0.62 mA maximum would 
cause fibrillation. 
12 
As current frequencies increase above 100 Hz, the Fibrillation Thres-
holds begin to rise similarly to the rise with decreasing frequency below 30 
hertz. Kouwenhoven, et al. [20] found that the shock current with a 
frequency of 1260 Hz which produced fibrillation was 12 times the fibrillation 
threshold at 60 Hz. Prevost and Battelli [13,25] reported that fibrillation 
voltages at 2000 Hz were 10 times the comparable voltages at 200 Hz. Geddes 
and Baker [4,14] also demonstrated that the levels of current required to 
cause fibrillation increased with increasing frequency. They reported that 
the current required to produce fibrillation in dogs at 3000 Hz is 22-28 times 
that at 60 Hz. Studies have also shown that the minimum fibrillating current 
at frequencies between 150 and 350 Hz is 5 to 40 times the minimum fibril-
lating current thresholds between 30 and 100 Hz [4]. Thus, both high 
frequency and low frequency currents are much safer than currents at power 
line frequencies. 
The minimum fibrillating thresholds associated with exposure to 
alternating currents in combination with direct currents has been assessed 
only by G. G. Knickerbocker [2,19]. In his dog experiments, the effects of 
20 Hz alternating currents and dc currents both alone and in combination were 
compared using statistical procedures. From his data, he was able to 
determine predictions for safety for shock durations > 0.5 seconds and < 0.2 
seconds. He does not make any predictions for shock durations between 0.2 and 
0.5 seconds. His work led to the following conclusions: 
1. For shock durations > 0.5 seconds, the risk from exposure to an 
arbitrary combination of ac and dc current is the same as that 
associated with an ac shock of the same peak-to-peak current, where 
the peak-to-peak current is defined as 
I 	= the greater of I
dc 
+ if (I(rms)),or 	 (1) 




2. For shock durations < 0.20 seconds, the risk of exposure to an 
arbitrary combination of ac and dc current is the same as that 
associated with a pure ac shock with the same peak current, where 







(rms)). 	 (2) 
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In both cases I ac 
is the rms value. The peak-to-peak current or peak current 
is then converted to an rms value (either I 
P-P
/2 /2 or Ipeak/VT) which is then 
related to the Dalziel curves and other published data on human shock effects 
to determine the relative hazard of the current. 
Impulse Currents  
The hazards due to impulse or surge currents, as in capacitor discharges, 
has been addressed only by Dalziel and Lee [1,2,5,8,9]. Although the shock 
intensity for currents at power line frequencies are determined by the crest 
of the current wave shape and its duration, the hazards due to very short 
duration shocks with decay time constants less than 0.1 seconds are related to 
the energy of the shock (in Joules or Watt-seconds), with current magnitude, 
quantity, and duration being related quantities of secondary importance. 
Dalziel has also suggested that this energy concept is suitable for evaluating 
the dangers resulting from short time exposure to power frequency currents as 
well as to impulse type currents. However, he also states that this analysis 
is probably not as accurate for power frequency currents as it is for dc 
pulses. In the Bell System literature, the statement is made that if the 
energy to which an average adult human is exposed does not exceed 50 Joules, 
then that shock is not likely to damage the heart [2]. The source of this 
threshold is not known. Thus, an energy threshold for capacitors of 1/2 
( CE
2 ) <50 Joules and for inductors of 1/2(LI 2 ) <50 Joules would be considered 
nonlethal. Dalziel [1,2,8], using data relating 60 Hz fibrillating currents 
to shocks of short duration, has derived an equation expressing the acceptable 
risk for a single, non-oscillatory exponential discharge which states 
1/2 (CE2 ) < 0.054 (Rb + Rc ). 	 (3) 
In this equation C is the capacitance in farads, E is the maximum storage 
energy of the capacitor prior to discharge in volts, Rb is the person's body 
resistance in ohms, and Rc is the resistance of the circuit excluding the 
person's body resistance. The equation would also apply to the discharge 
energy from an inductor. Thus, for a minimum Rb + R
c 
of 500 ohms, an 
acceptable discharge energy would be 27 Joules. Dalziel's analysis also shows 
that single oscillatory discharges of short duration are approximately twice 
as dangerous as non-oscillatory discharges, thus making the equation of risk 
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1/2 (CE 2 ) < 0.027 (Rb + Rc ). 	 (4) 
Dalziel offers substantial proof for the validity of his equations by 
comparing his predictions of safety to animal data and reports on 13 human 
accidents associated with exposure to impulse currents. No information is 
available in the literature regarding the dangers associ8.tedwithexposure to 
repetitive impulse currents. 
Electric fences are another form of impulse electric shock, although 
more of a blend between ac shocks and impulse shocks. An electric fence 
typically delivers pulse trains of 60 Hz current with a specified on-time and 
off-time. Underwriter's Laboratories Standards limit the current pulse train 
to 0.2 seconds duration with an off period of 0.8 seconds. The off period is 
required to permit a person to release his hold on the fence. During the on 
period the energy of the pulse train output delivered to a resistance of 500 
ohms is limited to 0.25 joules [1,9]. 
Burn Hazards  
Electrical burns result from the contact of body tissue with energized 
conductors which produces large quantities of heat as current passes through 
these tissues. Burns will occur only if the temperature of the tissue is 
raised sufficiently over a long enough duration to cause structural damage 
[3,24,31]. The degree of burn injury is dependent on (1) the current flow per 
unit time, (2) the voltage, (3) the area of contact with both the source and 
the ground and the depth to which the tissue is affected (hence, the volume of 
the affected tissue), and (4) the length of time of exposure [12,26,31]. If 
either the current flow is small enough, or the area of contact large enough, 
or the time of contact short enough, there will be no significant burns [3]. 
Joule heating can be expressed as the integral with respect to time of 
the power dissipated by the current over the duration of contact, or W = 
AI2R) dt = ,r(V2 /R)dt [22,26,28,30,31]. For steady-state currents and 
voltages, the time integral becomes simply a multiplication by time, or W = 
, 2 
ki R) • t = (V
2
/R) • t. However, these equations do not take into account many 
other factors which play a role in the biologic system such as physiologic 
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temperature regulation, air temperature, surface temperature, and radiation 
effects. In addition, as with any other type of biological/electrical inter-
action, one must have some knowledge of the cross-sectional area of the body 
elements involved, of the resistances of these body elements, and of the 
distribution of currents in these body elements [26]. These parameters are 
rarely known and can usually only be roughly approximated. 
Tissue damage has been shown to be secondary to the conversion of 
electrical to thermal energy [22], and the destruction of tissue is most often 
associated with protein coagulation [26]. The greater the resistance of the 
tissue, the greater will be the heat generated by a given current flow. For 
this reason, bone and skin and (to a lesser degree) muscle will generate more 
heat with the passage of a given amount of current than will nerves and blood 
vessels and tissues with higher conductivity [3,12,22,26,28,30]. However, 
the current flow will also preferentially choose the pathway of least 
resistance, thus, for the most part, bypassing tissues of high resistance if 
possible. Since the skin must be traversed in order for the current to flow, 
it is responsible for almost all of the resistance encountered by the current, 
and thus is the location of most electrical burn injuries. 
Henriques and Moritz [15,16,23,24] have performed one of the most 
complete studies relating skin surface burns to thermal injury. Through their 
research, it was found that temperatures above 60 °C would result in tissue 
destruction with exposure times as short as 5 seconds, while temperatures of 
51°C would not result in any significant tissue destruction until after 2 
minutes of exposure. However, any temperature greater than a few degrees 
above body temperature could result in tissue damage if contact is 
sufficiently prolonged. First degree burns (consisting principally of 
hyperemia without actual tissue destruction) could be produced by exposure of 
the skin to 50°C for 20 seconds, but no definite evidence of epidermal injury 
could be found until after 2 minutes of exposure. As a result of this work, 
Henriques and Moritz have established a plot of time-surface temperature 
thresholds at which cutaneous burning (greater than first-degree burns) 
occurs [2A]. This threshold chart has since been used by many subsequent 
authors as a basis for estimating burn potentials. Henriques and Moritz also 
demonstrated that repeated subthreshold thermal exposures were cumulative 
over the first 24 hours and would result in approximately the same degree of 
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thermal damage as would occur with continuous exposure to the same amount of 
thermal energy. 
In estimating the burn potential of electrical contacts, R. K. Wright and 
J. H. Davis [31] utilize the fact that 1 watt-second (or 1 joule) of energy 
generates 0.24 calories of heat in water and then appoximate the heat capacity 
and density of skin by that of water (1 °C • g/calorie x 1 cm3 /g). Assuming two 
one cm2 contact points (one energized and one grounded) and assuming that 
heating of the skin is concentrated below those contact points to a depth of 1 
cm, one can then calculate the rise in skin temperature associated with a 
given electrical contact using the formula Temperature in ° C = Energy x (0.24 
calories/joule) x (1 oC -g/calorie) x (1 cm 3/g) (2 cm3 Volume). For example, 
the minimum energy associated with the minimum fibrillation current at 60 Hz 
would be 1.0 watt-seconds (W = I2Rt :(0.1A)
2 
x (10000) x (0.1 seconds) = 1.0 
joules). This amount of energy would only be sufficient to raise the surface 
temperature of the described 2 cm 3 volume of skin (approximated by a 2 cm3 
volume of water) by 0.12°C which would be insufficient to cause any burns. 
Damage resulting from surface burns is most often found at the interface 
between the epidermis and the dermis (approximately 80 microns below the skin 
surface) [23,24,26]. Because of the higher resistance of the skin relative to 
internal body fluids, most of the heat production secondary to current flow 
will occur in the skin. Burns of the deep tissues will occur only with 
energies greater than that required to char the skin (temperatures greater 
than 65°C for longer than 10 minutes). Thus, the model for skin heating as 
described above is useful for estimating surface burn hazards of low energy 
electrical contacts since it assumes the current will seek the lower 
resistance pathways through the deeper body fluids below the surface of the 
skin. These low resistance pathways will then tend to form a "short circuit" 
between the two skin surface contacts. Although this model is fairly conserv-
ative by confining the area of heating only to the volume of skin directly 
below the surface contact area, the depth of heat concentration might be 
better approximated by the actual depth of the epidermis and dermis which is 
experiencing the heat damage, especially when examining fingertip and hand 
contact. For humans, this skin depth tends to average between 1-2 mm. Using 
this approximation for the depth of heating, the temperature rise resulting 




which is still inadequate to produce substantial surface burns. Both models 
of the skin will tend to overstate the possibility of surface burns since 
current in contact with the body tissues will most likely distribute over a 
larger volume of tissue than that directly underlying the surface contacts. 
In addition, it should be noted that for almost any amount of thermal energy, 
a small enough area of contact can be selected such that the possibility of a 
surface burn will be high. Thus, fingertip or spark gap type contacts will 
often generate a small burn whereas the same amount of energy over a larger 
surface area would be barely enough to redden the skin. 
Evaluation of the Safe Case  
Designs #1 and #2  
In evaluating the safety of this device, the voltage output across 
several resistances was measured using a high voltage probe (x 1000). 
Resistances were selected for testing between 500 ohms and 1,000,000 ohms in 
order to represent the full range of possible human body resistances as 
reported in the literature. The resistances tested were 220, 47052, 1k52, 
10M, lOOKS2, and 1W2. From these measurements the current could then be 
calculated and compared to the known limits of current safety discussed 
previously. Safe Case Designs #1 and #2 had almost identical results except 
that the peak voltage and energy output from Design #2 was slightly higher 
than #1. The following discussion will refer mainly to results from Design 
#1; however, in general the conclusions will apply to both designs. 
The voltage waveform across each resistance was a single spike with an 
exponential decay that repeated approximately every second. The data 
collected for each resistive load is summarized in Table 2, which lists the 
maximum measured voltage (Vmax), the calculated maximum current (1max the 
decay time constant of the spike (T), the time between spikes, the associated 
frequency of the discharge, the calculated energy of each spike (W), and the 
associated temperature rise that might be expected for each spike. 
Figure 2 displays graphically both the current (2-a) and the voltage (2-
b) as the resistance increases. In addition, the current graph (2-a) also 
shows several reported threshold levels for comparison. These levels will be 
digcussed shortly. The energy content of each spike was calculated by 
modeling the impulse as an exponential function that reaches V
max 
(or max ) 
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TABLE 2 











(V=0,368 Vmax) V 
. cm3/spike 
)- 	
T )  
(W = -11 - • 
2200 225V 1.025A 0.80 msec 1.0 sec 1 Hz 92 x 10-3 joules 22.08 x 10
-3 
4700 400V 0.85A 0.70 msec 1.0 sec 1 Hz 119 x 10
-3 joules 28.56 x 10-3 
10000 700V 0.70A 0.60 msec 1.0 sec 1 Hz 147 x 10
-3 joules 35.28 x 10-3 
10K0 1200V 0.12A 0.60 msec 1.0 sec 1 Hz 43 x 10
-3 joules 10.32 x 10 -3 
100K0 1250V 0.0125A .55 msec 0.9 sec 1.1 Hz 4.3 x 10
-3 joules 1.03 x 10-3 
IMO 1220V 0.00122A .55 msec 0.9 sec 1.1 Hz 0.41 x 10
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Resistance (in Ohms -log scale) 
Figure 2. (a) Maximum Current (I x) and (b) Maximum Voltage (V 	) of the, Impulse Shock Produced by Safe 
Case #1 as a Function o?. Resistance. Figures 2(a) also
m 
 Khows Several Thresholds of Safety for 
Purposes of Comparison: A. 5 Hz Let-Go Thresholds Determined by Dalziel [11], B. D.C. "Release 
Thresholds" Determined by Dalziel [11], C. 60 Hz Fibrillation Threshold for a 3 Second Shock for 
an Adult Male, D. D.C. Fibrillation Threshold for a Continuous Exposure Duration of 0.1 - 1.0 
Seconds, E. Fibrillation Threshold for a Single Current Pulse of Less than 10 msec. Duration 
(Either DC or 60 Hz) [2]. 
instantaneously and then decays with time constant T. Hence, V = Vmax 
e -t/T  
t 
f 	, , for t > 0. Using the energy equation„ W=f kV 2/R) dt, the energy of this 
(Vmax)2 T 	 0 spike would be W = 	 .71.(1-e
-2t4
). For t > 5T, as is the case for 
spikes occurring approximately every second, e -2t/T 1-0 so the energy 
equation becomes W = (vmax)
2 . T . 
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As resistance increases,the voltage increases until a maximum voltage of 
1250 V is achieved for resistances greater than 10KO. Current, on the other 
hand, is maximal at low resistances and decreases as resistance increases. As 
the resistance increases beyond 10KS-2, the current approaches zero and soon 
drops below the range of biological effects. As can be seen from Table 2, the 
frequency of repetition of the spike discharge is about 1 Hertz (Hz). Unfor-
tunately, there is no data reported in the literature concerning currents with 
a frequency of 1 Hz. There is also no data in the literature regarding the 
effects of repeated exposure to impulse discharges at this frequency. Accord-
ing to Dalziel [8], an average man should be able to tolerate a single impulse 
shock of as much as 27 joules without any appreciable risk, yet there is no 
mention made of repeated exposures. Ferris, et al. [13], found no cumulative 
effect on the ventricular fibrillation threshold with successive subthreshold 
shocks of 0.03 to 0.1 second duration, but these shocks were only adminis-
tered at 5 minute intervals. Thus, the heart is evidently able to recover 
from successive subthreshold shocks providing there is 5 minutes between 
shocks. Spear, et al. [27] found that the heart was more susceptible to 
fibrillation after a train of pulses than after a single pulse; however, the 
pulse trains consisted of pulses at a frequency of 100 Hz and these results 
could be simply related to Dalziel's findings of increasing susceptibility to 
fibrillation with increasing duration of exposure to power line currents. 
Kouwenhoven [20] examined 2 second shocks at a frequency of 2 Hz applied 
directly to the canine heart and was unable to cause fibrillation even at 
currents 5-6 times greater than the fibrillation threshold at 60 Hz. The 2 Hz 
current used was an interrupted direct current that had an on:off ratio of 
1:1. The Fibrillation Threshold for dc currents with a duration between 0.1 
and 1.0 seconds is commonly given as approximately 500 mA [2] and is 
illustrated on Figure 2(a) by dotted line D. For dc currents of less than 0.1 
second duration, the threshold increases with decreasing duration in a 1:1 
ratio (or ratio according to Dalziel) with the threshold for 60 Hz 
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currents for shocks of less than 0.1 second duration. 	For an exposure 
duration of 10 msec, the Fibrillation Threshold is given as 1 ampere 12,6,8,9] 
(illustrated in Figure 2(a) by dotted line E). However, this value is valid 
only for single shocks. 
The current impulse produced by Safe Case Design #1 is relatively safe 
when looked at as a single impulse. Its theoretical maximum energy output of 
0.16 joules (W = 1/2 (CV 2)) is close to the actual measured maximum value at 
1K0 of 0.147 joules and is definitely much less than Dalziel's acceptable 
energy surge of 27 joules. The decay time constant never exceeds 1 msec, so 
the maximal measured current of 1.02 A at 22052 compares favorably with the 
Fibrillation Threshold of 1.0 A for a current pulse of 10 msec duration. In 
addition,this resistance of 22052 is less than Dalziel's recommended minimum of 
50052 for the human body resistance. However, it must be assumed that a 
criminal trying to steal a case of money will not be easily deterred by a 
single current impulse and will try to hold onto the case over at least 
several current impulses. At this point, the frequency of the current 
impulses will begin to play a major role in determining the threshold of 
safety. The dc Fibrillation Threshold for durations between 0.1 and 1.0 
seconds as illustrated by line D in Figure 2(a) will most probably be a very 
generous estimate for the minimum fibrillation threshold of an exposure to any 
type of current at a frequency of 1 Hz. As can be seen by Figure 2(a), the 
currents produced by Design #1 are consistently above this threshold for 
resistances less than approximately 2500 ohms. 
The effect of waveform on Fibrillation Thresholds has never been 
adequately assessed in the literature. Kouwenhoven, et al. [20] found that 
interrupted direct current (similar to a square wave) was more likely to cause 
fibrillation than was a sinusoidal current at the same peak intensity, but the 
reason for this phenomenon was never elucidated. Dalziel 110] has examined 
the effect of waveform on Let-Go Thresholds and found the threshold to be 
mainly a function of peak current and relatively independent of the waveform 
itself. One is therefore inclined to extend this finding to Fibrillation 
Thresholds and state that these, too, are dependent only on peak current. 
Nevertheless, the available literature does not provide support for any 
theories of the effect of waveform on the safety of currents. 
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The energy content of each spike was maximal across a resistance of 11Q -2 
with a value of 0.147 joules which compares favorably with the theoretical 
maximal energy storage due to the capacitor of 0.16 joules. This value is 
also well within the safety limits established by Underwriter's Laboratories 
for electric fences [1]. Figure 3 displays the spike energy as a function of 
resistance and shows how the energy content decreases for both resistances 
greater than and less than 11[C-2. The theoretical temperature rise resulting 
from the energy of each spike is adapted from the estimation of burn potential 
proposed by Wright and Davis [31]. The temperature rise as given in Table 2 
is given in units of °C - cm3/spike and can be adapted to any desired tissue 
model after dividing by the proposed volume of the tissue being heated. The 
maximal calculated temperature rise is given for a resistance of 11M as 0.0353 
o
C - cm3 /spike. Using the Wright and Davis model of two 1 cm 3 volumes of skin 
in conjunction with the Henriques and Moritz chart of time and surface 
temperature thresholds for cutaneous burns, a person would have to hold onto 
the activated Safe Case #1 for more than 700 seconds before suffering anything 
more than first-degree burns. If heating of the skin is confined to a depth 
of 1 mm, the temperature rise will be 10 times greater and the perpetrator 
would have to hold onto the case for more than 80 seconds to achieve the same 
degree of burn. Even two fingertip contacts of, say, 1 mm x 1 mm each heated 
to a depth of 1 mm would only result in second degree burns after 3 seconds. 
Thus, the burn potential is extremely low. 
Similar measurements and analysis were made on Safe Case Design #2. The 
shock delivery mechanism of Design #2 was virtually identical to Design #1 
except for a slight change in the transformer turns ratio and the addition of 
an increased capacitance which increased the theoretical energy content of 
the discharge to 0.25 joules. As with Design #1, this energy limitation is 
within the energy criteria established by Underwriter's Laboratories for 
electric fences. Other than the increased values of voltage, current, and 
spike energy content, the results overall were virtually identical to that of 
Design #1. 	However, the current spikes for low resistances were at more 
dangerous levels than Design #1. 	Because of the similar results and 
conclusions, the data on Design #2 will not be presented. 
Both Design #1 and #2 had difficulty meeting safety threshold levels for 


























Resistance (in Ohms - log scale) 
Figure 3. Estimated Energy per Impulse Spike as a Function of Resistance 
for Safe Case Design #1. 
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resistances since the current would have very little shock potential for 
callous skin with impedances greater than 10K2. In addition, at low 
resistances the currents produced were very close to exceeding the 
ventricular fibrillation thresholds. Design #2 with its increased energy 
output and higher overall currents had improved shock potential at higher 
impedances, but also exceeded safety thresholds at low impedances. Neither 
design was felt to be entirely safe because of the high currents produced at 
low resistances. 
At this point, it will be helpful to describe in greater detail the 
effects of contact area on shock. Skin impedance, in addition to varying 
widely between individuals and with environmental conditions, will also vary 
inversely with the area of electrical contact. For fingertip contacts, the 
area of contact will be small, so the total resistance due to skin will be 
large. Because of this small contact area and large impedance, several 
electrical shock parameters will be affected. The high impedance will tend to 
limit the magnitude of the currents produced by the contact such that very 
little current is available to travel to the heart and cause fibrillation. 
The high impedance and small contact area will also increase the potential for 
surface burns as was just demonstrated. This is why most high energy 
electrical burns associated with brushing contacts are characterized only by 
pinhole burns of the skin surface. Finally, with small areas of contact, the 
current density will be higher and the perception of current will be more 
acute. A person attempting to steal the Safe Case will possibly try to 
decrease the painful effects by increasing the contact area and lowering the 
skin resistance by gripping the handle more tightly. Should this happen, the 
resistive component due to skin will be decreased and thus more current will 
flow into the deeper tissues. By gripping the handle tighter,a person will 
decrease his sensitivity to the current and his potential for surface burns at 
the risk of predisposing himself to deep tissue (e.g. muscle) heating and to 
the possible fibrillation effects of the current. An ideal shocking device 
would be a type of constant current device that would deliver a fairly 
constant current intensity over the range of human body resistances. As will 
be seen, Design #3 comes very close to meeting this ideal. 
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Design #3  
As with Designs #1 and #2, Safe Case Design #3 was evaluated by measure-
ments of the voltage waveform produced across a number of different 
resistances between 500 ohms and 1,000,000 ohms. The resistances selected 
were 5002, 1K2, 10K2, 100K2„ and 1142 and were chosen to represent the full 
range of reported human body resistances in the literature. From these 
voltage measurements, current could then be calculated and compared to 
reported limits of current safety. 
The Safe Case produced a variety of different waveforms depending on the 
resistance being tested. These waveforms are displayed in the photographs in 
Figures 4-8. The waveforms can be best described as resembling those of a 
capacitor discharging repetitively at a high frequency. The data collected 
for each resistive load is summarized in Table 3, which lists the voltage 
range, the current range, the period between individual discharges, the 
frequency of discharges, the decay time constant of the discharge spike, the 
duration of time that the pulse train was on, and the duration of time that the 
pulse train was off. Voltage and current ranges are given from peak-to-peak 
(V 	and I 	). It should be noted that for low resistive loads (5002 and 
P-P 	P-P 
100052), the pulse train in general showed an initially positive displacement 
with a lower frequency waveform which would rapidly decay to a baseline higher 
frequency waveform. 	Thus, the waveform is described in two parts: (1) the 
V 	, I 	, and period of the first observed spike waveform, and (2) the V 	, 
P-P P-P 	 P-P 
Ip_p , and period of the baseline waveform. The two different frequencies 
given for each of these low resistance loads are derived from their respective 
periods. For the high resistance loads (100K2 and 1M2), the waveform was 
constant and did not show the variation observed with the low resistance 
loads. The waveform for the 10K2 resistance was intermediate between the high 
and low resistance waveforms and showed only a small insignificant amount of 
variation. 
In general, the peak-to-peak voltages showed large increases with 
increasing resistance. The peak-to-peak currents tended to decrease with 
increasing resistance and are illustrated graphically in Figure 9. At low 
resistances the current seems to be asymptotically limited. The current also 
remarkably retains a fairly constant value over the entire tested range of 
resistance until after 100K2 when it begins to drop rapidly. The frequency of 
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Figure 4. Voltage Waveforms Produced by the Brink's Safe Case Design #3 Across a 500 Ohm Resistance 
(Measured Using a 1000 x High Voltage Probe). 
Figure 5. Voltage Waveforms Produced by the Brink's Safe Case Design #3 Across a 1000 Ohm Resistance 




Figure 6. Voltage Waveforms Produced by the Brink's Safe Case Design #3 Across a 10,000 Ohm Resistance 
(Measured Using a 1000 x High Voltage Probe). 
Figure 7. Voltage Waveforms Produced by the Brink's Safe Case Design #3 Across a 100,000 Ohm Resistance 
(Measured Using a 1000 x High Voltage Probe). 
      
     
     
     
     
      
       
    
   
    
    
 
Figure 8. Voltage Waveforms Produced by the Brink's Safe Case Design #3 a 1,000,000 Ohm Resistance 
(Measured Using a 1000 x High Voltage Probe). 
 
TABLE 3 
MEASURED PARAMETERS FOR EACH TEST LOAD 
(Safe Case #3) 
TT T Period Freq. Spike T Pulse Train Pulse Train Pulse Train Pulse Train.  







Off Period Freq. 
msec 4348 Hz 110 msec 0.97 sec 
1.0 sec 2.0 sec 0.5 Hz 
1.00 sec 
I msec 2000 Hz 130 msec 0.03 sec 
1.1 sec 2.15 cc 0.47 Hz 
3 msec 4348 Hz 110 msec 1.02 sec 
1.05 sec 
IU is ao 2 msec 3125 Hz 52 msec 1.0 sec 1.1 sec 2.1 sec 0.48 Hz 
(-330 - +60V) (-33 - +6) 
100kS/ -2400 - +200V -24 - +2 2.9 msec 345 Hz 200 msec 0.9 sec 1.0 sec 1.9 sec 0.53 Hz 
niA 
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Resistance (in Ohms — log scale) 
Figure 9. Current Amplitude Bounds of Waveforms Produced by Safe Case 
Design #3 vs. the Tested Resistances. Note the Changes in Current 
Amplitude for the Low Resistances from Initial to Baseline Values. 
33 
the produced waveform as a function of resistance is shown in Figure 10. The 
frequency response is roughly sigmoidal being limited to 4350 Hz at lower 
resistances and to 320 Hz at higher resistances. The frequency change is 
greatest between resistance values of 10Ka and 100Ka. 
Because of the lack of available information on exposure to repetitive 
impulse currents, an analysis of the safety of the Brink's Safe Case Design #3 
was felt to be inadequate when based solely on Dalziel's definition of safety 
for single impulse currents. Thus, our analysis consisted of an adaptation of 
G. G. Knickerbocker's equation [2,19] for evaluating the safety of combina-
tions of ac and dc currents. The analysis of the Brink's Safe Case waveform 
consisted of first modeling the current waveform as a sinusoidal current, then 
breaking this current model into its dc and ac components and applying 
Knickerbocker's equations for duration > 0.5 seconds (since all pulse train 
durations were > 0.5 seconds) to obtain an equivalent ac rms current which 
could then be compared to the adaptation of the Dalziel graphs in Figure 1. 
	
The first sinusoidal model used was obtained by setting the I 	of the 
P-P 
sinusoidal model equal to the I 	of the measured current (I 	= IHIGH  P-P P-P 
ILOW ) and then determining the dc current as half of the peak-to-peak current 
-  (Idc 	1/2 (IHIGH 	
LOW )). Figure 11 is a sketch of the sinusoidal model =  
superimposed on the measured waveform for each resistance. Table 4 lists the 
calculations involved in interpreting this model and the equivalent rms ac 
currents this model represents. These results are then plotted on the adapted 
Dalziel curves in Figure 12 and are found to all lie below the 99.5 percentile 
line for the Let-Go Threshold. 
Although this approximation is felt to be conservative, there was some 
concern that since we are dealing with the safety of individuals the model was 
not conservative enough. In light of the fact that most effects of current 
are related to the crest of the current wave [2,7,10,26], it was decided to 
evaluate another more conservative model. In the second model evaluated, the 
sinusoidal signal evaluated was given the same peak current (I 
PEAK VI EAK 
Iac (rms))as the measured waveform's peak-to-peak current (I p-p = 	- IHIGH 
ILOW ) while the dc part of the current was set at the most positive part of the 
waveform (IDC = IHIGH)' . A sketch of this second sinusoidal model is depicted 
in Figure 13 superimposed on sketches of the actual measured waveform for each 
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Resistance (in Ohms - log scale) 
Figure 10. Frequency of Waveforms Produced by Safe Case Design #3 vs. the 
Tested Resistances. Note the Changes in Frequency for the Low 













Figure 11. Sketch of the First Sinusoidal Model Used for the Evaluation of Waveform Safety Superimposed 
on Reproductions of the Measured Waveforms for Each of the Resistances Tested. The Waveform 
for the LC Resistance is Almost Identical to that for the 100 KQ Resistance. The Value for 
I
dc is Obtained as Shown, While the Value for I ac 
is Converted to RMS. 
TABLE 4 
CALCULATIONS USED TO ESTIMATE THE EQUIVALENT SINUSOIDAL CURRENT 
FOR PURPOSES OF COMPARING TO KNOWN SAFETY VALUES* 
METHOD #1 
Load 
' lac 	(peak)! 
I
ac
) Idc + 	Iac 2 	Iac 
Equivalent 






















-6 	mA 22 mA 28 mA 44 mA 15.6 mA 4348 Hz 
-13 mA 21 mA 34 mA 42 mA 14.9 mA 
10 K2 3125 Hz 
(-13.5 mA) (19.5 mA) (33 mA) (39 mA) (13.8 mA) 
100 KCI -11 mA 13 mA 24 mA 26 mA 9.2 mA 345 Hz 
1 MS2 -23 mA 2.7 mA 5 mA 5.4 mA 1.9 mA 323 Hz 
*Calculations are based on modeling the measured current as a sinusoidal current with the same I 	as 
the measured current's I . 
P-P 
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Figure 12. Current Levels Obtained Using the First Sinusoidal Approximation of the Measured Waveforms for 
(a) 5005, (b) 1 KO, (c) 10 KO, (d) 100 KO, and (e) 1M52. The Graph is Otherwise Identical to 
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Figure 13. Sketch of the Second Sinusoidal Model Used for the Evaluation of Waveform Safety Superimposed 
on Reproductions of the Measured Waveforms for Each of the Resistances Tested. The Waveform 
for the 1 MO Resistance is Almost Identical to that for the 100 KO Resistance. The Value for 
I
dc is Obtained as Shown, while the Value forac is Converted to RMS. 
TABLE 5 
CALCULATIONS USED TO ESTIMATE THE EQUIVALENT SINUSOIDAL CURRENT 




! lac (peak)! 
(= WI I
ac
) + 	I 





+42 mA 52 mA 94 mA 104 mA 36.8 mA 2857 Hz 
500 0 
+16 mA 44 mA 60 mA 88 mA 31.1 mA 4348 Hz 
+40 mA 46 mA 86 mA 92 mA 32.5 mA 2000 Hz. 
1000 SZ 
+16 mA 44 mA 60 mA 88 mA 31.1 mA 4348 Hz 
+8 mA 42 mA 50 mA 84 mA 29.7 mA 
10 K 0 3125 Hz 
(+6 mA) (39 mA) 45 mA (78 mA) (27.6 mA) 
100 K P +2 ma 26 mA 28 mA 52 mA 18.4 mA 345 Hz 
1 M c +0.4 mA 5.4 mA 5.8 mA 10.8 mA 3.8 mA 323 Hz 
*Calculations are'based on modeling the measured current as a sinusoidal current with the same I
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Figure 14. Current Levels Obtained Using the Second Sinusoidal Approximation of the Measured Waveforms for 
(a) 500 c, (b) 1 KS1, (c) 10 KO, (d) 100 KO, and (e) 1 M. The Graph is Otherwise Identical to 
the Plot of Dalziel's Thresholds in Figure 6. 
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1 
measured waveform in each case. Table 5 lists the calculations involved in 
interpreting this model and the equivalent rms ac currents obtained. These 
equivalent currents are then plotted on the Dalziel Threshold curves in Figure 
14. All of the plotted points lie on or below the 50th percentile for Let-Go 
Threshold at their respective frequencies. 
Thus, even with the most conservative sinusoidal model of the currents 
obtained, the currents never exceed the 50 percentile Let-Go Thresholds and 
thus never even approach the minimum fibrillation level which is above the 
one-half percentile for Let-Go. Even the maximum I 	of 42 milliamperes 
13- 1) 
across 500 Q is much less than the commonly accepted threshold rms current of 
100 mA for 60 Hz sinusoidal shocks of 3 seconds or more. It is also much less 
than the minimum fibrillating current for children of 100 mA (rms) for 60 Hz 
shocks of 1.0 second duration. It should also be mentioned that these 
thresholds are even safer when one considers that fibrillating thresholds in 
the frequency range produced by the Safe Case Design #3 have been shown to be 
between 5 to 40 times greater than the 60 Hz thresholds mentioned above. 
It can therefore be stated with great confidence that the Brink's Safe 
Case Design #3 is safe for normal healthy adults and possibly even for 
children with respect to the danger of ventricular fibrillation. In addition, 
this design is advantageous in that the currents produced are very close to 
the minimum Let-Go Thresholds over a wide range of resistances, thus ensuring 
a painful shock. As discussed previously, it is extremely desirable to have a 
constant current type of device over a wide range of resistances for any type 
of safe human electrical contact. Safe Case Design #3 provides a fairly 
consistent peak-to-peak current of from 25-52 mA over the resistances ranging 
from 500 ohms to 100,000 ohms. From the trend of the data, it is not expected 
that the peak-to-peak current would ever exceed 60 mA even for resistances 
lower than 500 ohms. Despite the possibility of a low shock potential for 
high resistance skin, it must be remembered that skin resistance will always 
tend to decrease as the duration of electrical contact increases. Thus, even 
an initially high resistance contact will eventually decrease with time and 
increase the shock intensity. 
Although these currents are close to the Let-Go Thresholds, there is no 
danger of a victim "freezing" to the Safe Case and not being able to drop it 
because of the pulsed nature of the current. For each resistance tested the 
42 
pulse train had an on time of approximately 1 second and an off time of 
approximately 1 second. Skeletal muscle has a relaxation time typically on 
the order of 10 msec. Summation of the muscle contractions progressing to 
tetanus, or "freezing", of the victim to an electrical contact will only occur 
at stimulation frequencies greater than 10 per second. At these frequencies, 
the muscles being stimulated do not have enough time to relax completely 
between contractions, and thus the muscle "freezes". By pulsing the current 
with current pulse trains with an off time of about 1 second, the hand and arm 
muscles will have more than ample time to relax completely before the next 
pulse train, and thus, to let go of the Safe Case. This is the same principle 
employed in the standards for electric fence controllers which limit the pulse 
to an on period of 0.2 seconds and an off period of 0.8 seconds [1]. For the 
purposes of the electric fence, 0.8 seconds is felt to be more than a 
sufficient period of time for the stimulated muscles to relax and prevent 
"freezing" to the fence. 
The thin mesh fabric surrounding the handle prevents good contact from 
being made with the case, thus increasing the current density of the contact 
which in turn increases the skin surface sensitivity to the perception of the 
current. It is possible that mesh fabric may introduce a capacitive effect 
which, at these frequencies, may actually serve to lower the total skin 
impedance and thus increase the intensity of the shock. 
Because of the irregular waveforms produced, the energy content of the 
individual pulses was not as easily calculated as for Designs #1 and #2. In 
order to simplify the energy calculations, the waveforms were approximated by 
either two triangles or a triangle and a rectangle below and above the zero 
voltage baseline. For low resistances that showed a transient change in 
waveform, the waveform was again described in two parts and separate energy 
calculations were ma e fo each. The energy content of a triangular waveform 
is W = ,f(V
2
/R)dt = . For a rectangular waveform, the energy 




• t. Table 6 lists the calculations made 
to estimate the energy per impulse (W p ) for each resistance. Again, these are 
conservative estimates and will tend to overestimate the actual energy 
present. Using these values for W , the total energy in each pulse train (W
T
) 
is estimated by multiplying by the number of pulses present, which in turn is 
estimated by dividing the total time that the pulse train is on (t
on
) by the 




= W , x (ton/T), and these 
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Load 	V1 t 1 
2 
V 	t • W., = ( 1) . t1 
R 	3 
      
(volts) (msec) 	(joules) 
TABLE 6 
CONSERVATIVE CALCULATIONS USED TO ESTIMATE THE ENERGY PER PULSE (We) 
DELIVERED BY SAFE CASE DESIGN 4#3 TO VARYING RESISTIVE LOADS 
(see text for method of approximation) 








2 	 2 	
W V t 
or 2 	-- 	2 1 	
t2 
 R 	
-3-, R  = 
(volts) (msec) (joules) (joules) (joules) 
50052 	-6 	0.06 	0.07 x 10-4 +40 	0.29 	3.09 x 10-4 3.16x10-4 
-15 	0.11 	0.17 x 10-4 +13 	0.12 	1.35 x 10-4 0.305x10
--,4 




-30 	0.11 	0.33 x 10-4 +20 	0.12 	0.16 x 10-4 0.49x10-4 
10K0 -360 	0.09 	3.89 x 10-4 +80 	0.23 	 1.47 x 10
-4 5.36x10
-4 
100K0 -2500 	0.5 	104.0 x 10-4 +200 	2.4 	 9.60 x 10-4 113.6x10-4 
1M52 -5200 	0.3 	27.0 x 10-4 +400 	2.7 	 4.32 x 10-4 31.3x10-4 
TABLE 7 
CONSERVATIVE CALCULATIONS USED TO ESTIMATE THE ENERGY PER PULSE TRAIN (W p) 
DELIVERED BY SAFE CASE DESIGN #3 TO VARYING RESISTIVE LOADS AND THE TEMPERATURE RISE 
CC • cm3 /PULSE TRAIN) WHICH MIGHT BE EXPECTED IN A VOLUME OF SKIN TISSUE. 
Load 	W Time On (t
on
) Pulse Period (T) 
t
on Temperature Rise 
WT = WP x 	T P 
(joules) 
5005 	3.16 x 10 4 




0.49 x 10-4 
10KS1 5.36 x 10
-4 
100K1 113.6 x 10
-6 
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Figure 15. Estimated Energy per Pulse Train (WT) as a Function of 
Resistance for Safe Case #3. 
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values are displayed in Table 7. Based on these estimates, the maximum energy 
content of any of the pulse trains measured was 3.5 joules and was delivered 
to the resistance of 1001U. Figure 15 is a graphical interpretation of the 
energy content of the pulse trains (WT) delivered by Safe Case Design #3 as a 
function of the tested resistance. As can be seen, the energy delivered to 
the resistance is maximal at approximately 100IM and drops off sharply on 
either side of this resistance. Unfortunately, there is no way to know if 
this maximum measured energy represents the true maximal energy output of the 
Safe Case or not; however, it is doubtful that the maximum energy would ever 
exceed 5 joules. 
The energy output of the pulse train across the 500 ohm load is only 
0.156 joules. Thus, this Safe Case design also lies well within the Under-
writer's Laboratories Standards for electric fences [1]. However, the pulse 
duration of approximately 1 second is longer than that recommended for 
electric fences. 
The theoretical temperature rise resulting from the energy discharges 
from each pulse train is also listed in Table 7 using the same method of 
modelling and calculation as previously described for Designs #1 and #2. For 
a skin resistance of 100K52, the theoretical temperature rise would be 0.846 
o
C-cm3/pulse train. It should be noted that the pulse trains only occur every 
2 seconds, therefore it would be more correct in estimating burn hazards with 
time if these temperature rise values were averaged over 2 seconds. It has 
already been shown by Henriques and Moritz that repeated subthreshold thermal 
injuries are cumulative. With a maximum time-averaged temperature rise of 
0.423 
oC-cm3/sec, a contact of two 1 cm 3 volumes of skin would have to be 
maintained for more than 70 seconds to achieve second degree burns. If 
heating were assumed to be limited to 1 mm depth, contact would have to be 
maintained for greater than 8 seconds, or over more than 4 pulses. For 2 
fingertip contacts of 1 mm x 1 mm dimensions and with an assumed depth of 
heating of 1 mm, pinhole burns of the surface of the skin would be 
instantaneous. Thus, although the burn potential is present with Safe Case 
Design #3, the person stealing the case would have tolerated a great deal of 
pain and would have plenty of time to decide to drop the case before skin 
surface burns would become a problem. Even if the maximum energy discharge 
were as much as 5 joules for some unknown resistance, a person with only two 1 
47 
cm2 surface area contacts would have to maintain that contact for greater than 
30 seconds and would have received 15 shocks before second degree burns would 
appear. 
In summary, Safe Case Design #3 is felt to be a safe device for human 
contact assuming the resistances for human contact are, as stated in the 
literature, between 500 ohms and 1,000,000 ohms. The currents produced by 
this device should not be sufficient to cause ventricular fibrillation in the 
average healthy adult and, presumably, in the average healthy child. Persons 
coming into contact with the activated device will experience some degree of 
pain and possibly severe tetanic muscle contractions of the affected 
extremity. Current off times of 1 second or more are of sufficient duration 
to allow a person to let-go of the case after even just one shock. If the 
person insists on tolerating many shocks over a prolonged period of time, 
there does exist a potential for second degree and even third degree burns. 
Finally, it must be recognized that any theoretical thresholds of safety 
are merely theoretical and not absolute. Such threshold values are designed 
to be conservative and will give predictions on the side of safety. However, 
even with ventricular fibrillation thresholds, the best estimate possible is 
a value that would be safe for 99.5% of the population. That leaves the 
possibility that 0.5% of the population could go into ventricular 
fibrillation with a shock below that value. Dalziel has stated: 
"Because of the wide variation in the physical condition of 
individuals, it is impossible to justify any electric shock as safe 
for all individuals. 	The press contains frequent accounts of 
fatalities ascribed to heart failure caused by overexcitement, 
intense emotion, fear, or shock. For such susceptible persons, it 
is possible that contact with any electric circuit which permits 
currents in excess of the threshold of sensation might result in 
fatality. This possibility must be recognized, and an occasional 
death is to be expected from casual contact involving electric 
currents known to be safe for most normal individuals. Death in 
such cases must be considered due to shock of the nervous system, 
and not to the primary effects of electric current." [8] 
The purpose of this report is to analyze the possibility of a safety 
hazard due to the primary effects of electric current. This hazard has been 
48 
evaluated and Safe Case Design #3 has been found to be reasonably safe for 
human contact. This statement is not to be interpreted as saying that the 
Safe Case is 100% safe for everybody it may shock. Electrical contact with 
the case should be avoided if at all possible. Any person in charge of 
activating the Case or involved with transport of the Case should have 
training in CPR (Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation) techniques. Such training is 
readily available through the American Red Cross, the American Heart 
Association, and many local civic organizations. In addition, any vehicle 
involved with the transport of this Case should have easy radio access to 
ambulance services and emergency facilities. Only under these conditions can 
the Safe Case by considered as safe as humanly possible. 
49 
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